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Résumé : les investisseurs et les entreprises réalisent de plus en plus que le changement 
climatique et les besoins qui y sont associés vont impacter structurellement l’économie. Dans 
cette optique, ce papier cherche à comprendre ces impacts sur la stratégie des entreprises, à 
travers l’étude des systèmes de management. Une typologie est proposée, basée sur un modèle 
en deux étapes. A l’étape une, la firme aborde la question du CO2 sous l’angle du risque et de 
la mise en conformité. A l’étape deux, la firme est impliquée dans une réévaluation plus 
globale de ses relations avec ses clients et fournisseurs. Cette construction est basée sur trois 
études de cas : Dupont (chimiste), Lafarge (matériaux de construction) et Unilever (produits 
de consommation). Des implications sont tirées de cette analyse pour les investisseurs. 
 
Mots-clefs : Emissions CO2 – Responsabilité Sociale de l’Entreprise – Stratégie – Systèmes de 
Management 
 
Abstract: investors and companies are increasingly aware that climate change and its 
associated needs for reducing CO2 emissions are likely to impact structurally many areas of 
the economy. This paper offers a contribution to understand these impacts on companies’ 
strategy, by studying management systems. A typology is introduced based upon a two stage 
model. At stage one, the firm becomes aware of the risk and CO2 is a compliance issue. At 
stage two, the firm is involved in a more global re-assessment of its business portfolio 
including its relationship with suppliers and clients. The construction is based on three case 
studies: DuPont (chemicals), Lafarge (building materials) and Unilever (consumer goods). 
The implications of the analysis for investors are drawn. 
 
Key-words: Corporate Social Responsibility – CO2 emissions – Management Systems – 
Strategy 
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1 Introduction  
Over the past decade, the debate on climate change has dramatically shifted. The strong 
evidence presented by the scientific community through the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) process established by the United Nations Environment Program 
(UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) has largely settled the 
discussion about whether an action should be taken to stabilize atmospheric greenhouse gases 
(GHGs) (Parry et al., 2007). Climate change is now acknowledged as being a serious global 
threat which demands an urgent response. For example, the Stern Review on the economics of 
climate change estimates that without any global action, the overall costs and risks of climate 
change would be equivalent to losing at least 5% of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
each year, which could rise to 20% if a wider range of risks and impacts are taken into 
consideration (Stern, 2006). The question is: what should be the response to address the 
challenge of global warming while maintaining at the same time an economic growth (Mc 
Kinsey Global Institute, 2008). With this in mind, environmental concerns are becoming an 
increasing central topic for strategic choices and decision-making by investors around the 
world.3 
 
According to leading consultancy, investors would be more than 80% to consider climate 
change as a very or somewhat important factor when investing (Mercer Investment 
Consulting & Carbon Disclosure Project, 2009). The Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) was 
launched in 2000 to collect high quality information on CO2 emissions. In 2009, it provided 
information concerning over 2,000 organizations in 66 countries, and grouped no less than 
475 institutional investors – holding $55 trillion in assets under management – and 60 
purchasing organizations.4 However, despite assessing CO2 emissions as a key dimension to 
analyze when selecting companies for the portfolios, a significant number of investors 
acknowledge to keep working on how to integrate climate data into their existing systems, 
models and processes.5 Almost five years after the European Union Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Trading System (EU ETS) debut of operation, Mercer concluded its study by stating that only 
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a very small handful of investors have succeeded in directly and systematically taking into 
account climate considerations into their actual stock selection. 
 
The discrepancy between the major restructuring consequences of the climate change 
challenge and the relatively slow response of financial professionals may be explained by two 
very different factors. Firstly, for years, environmental pressure had been perceived by 
investors neither as a risk nor as an opportunity which could structurally impact companies’ 
bottom line. As a direct result, investors have historically regarded explicitly and addressing 
environmental factors in their investment strategies as incompatible with their fiduciary 
responsibilities (Innovest, 2007). The context has now significantly changed. Secondly, at a 
more fundamental level, the lack of academic consensus on the macro-impacts of 
environmental regulations on the profitability of firms did not provide a sound basis to 
develop operational tools. 
 
Indeed, when analyzing the academic literature, two approaches emerge. On the one 
hand, a view, known as the “Porter hypothesis” (Porter, 1990; Porter & van der Linde, 1995) 
asserts that stricter environmental standards can spur innovations which enhance 
competitiveness and contribute to make companies more profitable. This virtuous mechanism 
is said to lead to the so-called “win-win” situation in which both a better environment and a 
higher financial performance are achieved. This view has benefited over the past decades 
from a growing interest among politicians and practitioners.6 
 
On the other hand, according to a neo-classical economic perspective, tightening 
environmental regulations through norms or taxes, will reduce the choice set of the firm and 
cannot benefit a profit maximizing firm (Fogler & Nutt, 1975). Indeed, Palmer et al. (1995) 
use the standard economic framework to demonstrate that more stringent environmental 
constraints cannot generate a higher profit, even if the firm innovates. They also provide 
counter arguments as regards the fact that more stringent environmental evidence in the US in 
the 80’s relative to the EU or Japan would have caused the possible loss of competitiveness of 
US industry. 
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 4 
The academic attention has then shifted from macro to micro evidence. Wagner (2003) 
reviews more than 20 empirical studies which have tested the Porter hypothesis and shows 
that no relationship between environmental regulations and financial performance can be 
demonstrated. Ambec and Lanoie (2008) identify three possible ways in which environmental 
constraints may induce higher profit: cost reductions, increased revenues and lower cost of 
capital. They review the empirical cases in this respect, pointing out positive or contradictory 
evidence. 
 
Altogether, it is not surprising that investors be still in search for adequate tools to assess 
the impacts of more stringent CO2 regulation on their portfolios. In this paper, we want to 
contribute to this question by providing a systematic framework to evaluate the response of 
firms to this new environment. We take the position that previous studies on the Porter 
hypothesis at the micro-level have neglected an important factor that could explain the 
ambiguity of the empirical results: the managerial dimension of strategy, i.e. the 
organizational conditions in which a firm elaborates and implements its strategy. We suggest 
that environmental regulations can systematically lead to a better financial performance only 
if the new strategic choices have led to a transformation of organizational processes and 
management systems. This view is in line with some previous work. For instance, Ambec and 
Barda (2002) associate the Porter hypothesis with agency problems. Gabel and Sinclair 
Desgagné (1998) attribute the hypothesis on the prevalence of organizational routines. Our 
model also takes into consideration the fact that agents in the firm operate under bounded 
rationality and informational constraints. 
 
To elaborate our construction, we build upon a comparative study of three companies 
belonging to different sectors, to wit: DuPont (chemicals), Lafarge (building materials) and 
Unilever (consumer goods). These firms operate at different levels of the added value chain: 
DuPont provides components to manufacturers, Lafarge belongs to the manufacturing sector 
and Unilever delivers goods for the final consumers. This differentiated choice obeys a 
twofold will: 1) to provide a general model of change regardless of the firm’s business and 2) 
to analyze the managerial dimension of the Porter hypothesis in firms which face different 
forms of environmental regulations and pressures regarding climate change. Indeed, we 
believe that organizational and business diversities are key advantages when developing 
managerial models. 
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The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains what we mean by a managerial 
perspective, building on Simons’ synthetic work on organizations (Simons, 1995). It also 
reviews a preliminary positioning of firm’s environmental and social strategy in those terms, 
based upon an empirical survey of large French firms (Arjaliès & Péan, 2009). This 
positioning will be used to construct our own typology. Section 3 introduces this typology. It 
is hypothesized that firms follow a two stage process: at the first stage, the strategy of the firm 
is associated with awareness/risk while at the second stage it is associated with 
vision/opportunities. The relevance of this model to structure the strategies actually followed 
by DuPont, Lafarge and Unilever is discussed in details. Section 4 revisits the Porter 
hypothesis. Section 5 comes back to the investors, and draws the implications of our results 
for the design of adequate tools to assess the impacts of climate change on portfolio analysis, 
giving due consideration to the factors that may trigger the passage of a firm from stage one to 
stage two. Section 6 concludes. 
2 The managerial framework and some preliminaries findings on how 
firms manage CSR 
2.1 The managerial framework 
To adapt to its environment, a firm must keep innovating and evolving. According to 
bounded rationality perspective (Cyert & March, 1963), firms should encourage 
organizational learning (Argyris & Schon, 1978) and local initiatives for generating emergent 
strategies (Mintzberg, 1989) while controlling that the chosen strategies are well 
implemented. Simons (1995) has elaborated a comprehensive framework to analyze strategic 
and organizational change in this framework. It relies on four performance systems.  
 
− The first two systems are key cognitive tools to ‘frame’ what can and cannot be 
done both in terms of behaviors and actions: 
o Beliefs systems set the core values of the company to create a sense of 
commitment and belonging on part of the employees.  
o Boundary systems set the framing for strategic elaboration and analysis. 
They orientate managers’ actions by showing what is permitted. 
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− The other two systems refer to the planning and control procedures. In particular, 
they are concerned with the information systems needed to support these 
procedures. 
o Diagnostic systems typically involve a wide range of indicators, which 
reflect the different facets of a company’s performance, for internal or 
external use. They aim at ensuring that managers meet the firms’ strategic 
goals. Control is made by exception, with actions taken whenever reported 
data widely differ from targets. 
o Interactive systems involve a limited range of indicators to create a total 
determination of the management on a selected set of goals. Their purpose 
is to stimulate organizational learning by encouraging managers to 
innovate. The control takes the form of a very high degree of interaction 
along the hierarchical line. The interactive control systems will focus on 
areas varying from company to company according to a critical 
performance criteria. 
 
It is the joint use of these four systems which permits firms to drive strategic renewal by 
favoring continuous innovation and ensuring that the implemented strategic actions are 
coherent and efficient. A summary of this process is provided in figure 1. 
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Figure 1: a dynamic relationship (source Simons (1995)) 
 
In his research, Simons gives particular attention to the differences between diagnostic 
and interactive systems. He points out the connection between the major sources of strategic 
uncertainty (regulatory constraints, cost efficiency, launching of new products…) and the 
interactive systems to be put in place. He also emphasizes that the design of managerial 
compensation should be different in both systems. Compensation should typically be based on 
objective criteria for the diagnostic systems which are result oriented, and on subjective 
criteria for the interactive ones which are process oriented. Objective and subjective criteria 
constitute the extrinsic part in the motivational system of the firm. The beliefs systems of the 
firm have a direct role on the intrinsic motivation of the employees and as such they 
contribute to their alignment with the goals of the firm.7 
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 That intrinsic (i.e. symbolic) and extrinsic (i.e. financial) motivation need to be thought as complements has 
become an important issue (Bénabou & Tirole, 2006). 
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The relevance of this framework has been illustrated by a number of case studies made by 
Simons and others.8 Simons’ approach will be used as a starting point for our model. Two 
other dimensions need to be added to provide our managerial framework. The first dimension 
refers to the necessary cross-functional aspect of environmental strategies: interactive systems 
should be designed so as to promote horizontal interaction, for instance between functional 
and operational departments to evaluate the risks, and to design appropriate responses. This 
cross-functional dimension of management systems is not addressed by Simons in his 
typology while it is an important feature in the implementation of turnaround strategies.9 The 
second dimension relates to the participation of external stakeholders such as NGOs and 
scientists in strategic deliberation. More than on any other corporate topics, environmental 
issues may involve an important number of firms’ outsiders. As a result, Simons’ framework 
should be used both at the internal and external levels, focusing explicitly on the relationships 
between firms and their stakeholders. 
2.2 How firms manage CSR: some preliminary findings 
In this section, we revisit a recent comparative analysis of the CAC 40 companies10 
conducted by Arjaliès and Péan (2009).11 The main finding of this analysis is puzzling: while 
companies have acknowledged the strategic importance of CSR for businesses, they still 
devote limited ressources and time to such concerns. The study demonstrates that companies 
have not yet developed appropriate management systems to trigger strategic and practical 
change. According to the authors, this is the main reason explaining why no strategic renewal 
has yet been conducted by these companies to meet the CSR challenge. In line with our 
general management perspective, different elements can be put forward from this study: 
 
CSR is now deemed to be essential for companies’ long-term survival.  
CSR has progressively become a major issue at the corporate level. Indeed, companies 
must meet an increasing number of demands regarding CSR both from their clients and 
stakeholders. As a result, CSR would become as of now a necessary pre-requisite for 
companies to be able to maintain their business and their so-called ‘license to operate’. 
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 The CAC 40 companies are the 40 biggest French listed companies. 
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However, the integration of CSR concerns remains limited in practice. 
The recognition of CSR as a corporate issue has not been translated into operational 
goals. Firstly, CSR has not yet generated many demonstrative business cases. Secondly, CSR 
demands are rarely framed on the situations experienced by operational managers in practice. 
Thirdly, companies face difficulties when implementing CSR strategies as a result of their 
lack of cross-functional approach. Finally, despite their assertion on CSR importance for 
business, most companies would still separate CSR issues from business related issues.  
 
Diagnostic systems dominate for external reporting.  
This focus of diagnostic systems on external reporting can be explained by the 
domination in practice of a risk approach of CSR. In other words, management systems would 
be first used to avoid behaviors which could endanger companies’ license to operate and not 
to generate strategic opportunities. The study gives the evidence that the means dedicated by 
the companies to CSR are too limited to permit the generation of structural strategic change. 
For example, the important feedback dimension of control systems is lacking in many 
companies. This prevents from a systematic process of improvement of existing practices. 
 
Interactive systems exist but their influence is limited.  
As for diagnostic systems: interactive systems suffer from a lack of feedback, which 
makes the capitalization on innovative ideas difficult. Moreover, managers’ commitment to 
such systems is limited, as a result of their perception of CSR as being meaningless for 
business as usual. Thus, whereas companies assert that CSR is likely to play a key role in 
terms of innovation and strategic renewal, only few of them are able to design interactive 
systems to achieve the associated goals. 
 
This study provides a broad picture in which it demonstrates that CSR is more and more 
integrated into the beliefs systems of firms, but mainly as a risk/compliance issue. The 
diagnostic systems are adapted to provide the data required by external bodies (regulatory and 
social rating agencies, NGOs…) through emerging standards such as GRI (Global Report 
Initiative). Boundary systems are almost not impacted and there is no CSR action program 
followed by innovative interactive systems. This shows that companies still separate CSR 
actions from business as usual. We will see in this paper that detailed case studies provide a 
less extreme picture (see also the other case studies included in this volume). Our goal is 
precisely to provide a systematic framework to organize isolated case studies. 
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3 The two stage model for implementing a CO2 strategy: from 
awareness/risk to vision/opportunities 
In this section, we elaborate on the general framework introduced in section 2 to 
formulate the hypothesis on how firms implement their CO2 strategy. The hypothesis is 
explained as a two-stage model. In simple words, stage one would correspond to the situation 
described in the preceding survey and applied to CO2: climate change appears as an 
awareness/risk issue mostly of concern at the corporate level. We shall hypothesize that some 
operational actions may still take place, as long as the corresponding programs are directly 
aligned with the compliance goals formulated at the corporate level. Stage two is not based on 
the survey but on our detailed case studies. We shall hypothesize that firms in stage two will 
consider climate change as an opportunity and characterize the four management systems that, 
in our view, would support such a strategy. An important theoretical question will then be 
addressed: are there conditions that could trigger the passage for firms from stage one to stage 
two? This question will be addressed in section 4, while revisiting the Porter hypothesis. 
3.1 The main ideas underlying the model 
We start by giving the main ideas of the model and then discuss them in full.   
 
− Stage 1: Awareness/Risk 
 
CO2 risk is identified but awareness is limited in the sense that only some managers in the 
firm, typically functional managers at the corporate level, are aware of this risk and can 
provide quantifiable measures in terms of loss of revenues and/or increase of costs. Neither 
the beliefs nor the boundary systems are affected by change. 
 
Some specific actions may be undertaken to counter change due to CO2 regulation in the 
environment, such as delaying its impact on firm’s activities through lobbying and/or 
mitigating emissions in production. 
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Firm’s control systems remain in place. Eventually, diagnostic systems are by increments 
updated to measure and mitigate the actual emissions. No specific interactive system is 
designed to elaborate and implement radical change. 
 
− Stage 2: Vision/Opportunities 
 
The core values of the firm address the challenge created by CO2 emissions in a positive 
way through a reformulation of the firm’s vision and corporate culture. This induces a 
reformulation of the beliefs and boundary systems to drive strategic and organizational 
change. 
 
Changes in the boundary systems make possible strategic formulation at the corporate 
level for the whole sector, along the chain value, with the goal to identify the strengths and 
weaknesses of the firm relative to its competitors, suppliers and customers. 
 
The strategic orientation is explained through action plans. These action plans are 
explicitly introduced into the control systems. Dedicated diagnostic systems are integrated 
into the general planning and control systems of the firm. Dedicated interactive systems are 
designed to follow up the targets associated with the new vision.  
 
3.2 Revisiting DuPont, Lafarge and Unilever strategies through this model 
Our model is now applied to revisit the respective implementations of CO2 strategy in 
DuPont, Lafarge and Unilever. Figure 2 provides a synthesis view of these firms in 2008. It 
gives their CO2 emissions levels as of today and summarizes their current targets on these 
emissions. The three firms generate CO2 mainly through their manufacturing activities, with 
some or many European Union (EU) plants eligible for the EU-ETS12, in our case for 
Unilever and Lafarge respectively. In the US, all firms have plants that would potentially be 
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 EU-ETS refer to the European Union Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading System, which is a major pillar of 
EU climate policy.  
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subject to a CO2 regulation. However, the relative significance of these industrialized CO2 
emissions is more important for Lafarge, with cement representing both its major product and 
its main source of emissions, than for the other two companies which are diversified. DuPont 
is an upstream company which produces industrial components for electronics, textiles, motor 
vehicles, construction materials, agriculture and plastics and so forth whereas Unilever is a 
downstream company which produces consumer goods through around 400 brands covering 
food, household and personal care products. The ’test’ of our model for these differentiated 
companies will provide an indication of their potential value to handle many different 
situations. 
 
 DUPONT LAFARGE UNILEVER 
Headquarters’ 
location Wilmington, USA Paris, France London, UK 
Revenues MM $ 30.5  19 MM € 41 MM € 
Employees 60 000 84 000 174 000 
CO2 emissions (Mt) 
from CDP 2008 9.3 108.9 1.2 
Current Target in 
2008 
15% for 2015/2004 
(absolute value) 
20% 2010/1990 
(relative value) 
25% 2012/2004 
(relative value) 
 
Figure 2: DuPont, Lafarge and Unilever at a glance 
 
The case studies were elaborated in two steps: step one, a standard questionnaire was 
filed by the authors based on public information (company reports, carbon disclosure reports 
(CDP), press articles, articles published in academic journals…); step two, interviews with 
companies’ representatives were utilized to complement this outside view.13  
 
We are using the outputs of these case studies to give substance to our model. In this 
construction, it will be important to keep in mind that we refer to CO2 in a broad sense so as 
taking into account the diversity in which the operations of these three companies affect the 
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 We interviewed executives from these three companies but also from other companies in the same sectors. We 
also interviewed financial analysts. We are indebted to these executives for their responses to our inquiry. The 
authors remain the sole responsible for the views and analysis presented in this paper.  
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climate. DuPont’s involvement started with the recognition of the CFC impact on the ozone 
hole. Unilever’s involvement mainly comes through the sourcing of palm oil and its impact on 
deforestation. There have been different policies to tackle these different impacts and the 
firms’ responses varied accordingly. Moreover, the public questioning on the detrimental 
effects of CFC emissions on CO2 emissions from manufacturing and on CO2 emissions from 
deforestation have not appeared at the same time and triggered different responses. 
 
The first scientific paper hypothesizing a connection between CFC and the ozone hole is 
from 1974. In 1987, the Montreal protocol to reduce and eliminate CFC was signed by 24 
Nations and the EU. In 2007, 191 Nations revisited the Montreal protocol and expressed their 
satisfaction that all CFC production would end in 2010. 
 
Awareness of the GHGs on global climate change has been much slower than awareness 
of the impact of CFC on the ozone hole. The IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change) was founded in 1989. The scientific hypothesis that connects CO2 and global climate 
change has been clearly formulated but an agreement on this hypothesis has not yet reached 
the same level of consensus as for CFC and the ozone hole. The Kyoto protocol was open for 
ratifications in 1998, but it sets binding targets for only 36 industrial countries so far. 
Moreover, the Nations’ commitment (i.e. countries in Annex B of the Protocol) to reduce 
emissions by 5.2% on the period 1990/2012 will not be reached. To say the least, the 
Copenhagen meeting, in December 2009, did not lead to an international binding agreement. 
 
Deforestation had remained largely ignored by the Kyoto protocol. Firstly, deforestation 
mainly occurs in developing countries (which are not in Annex B). Secondly, following the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, these countries did not have to 
commit to any reduction of emissions. Furthermore, despite international debate on this issue, 
forest conservation projects are excluded from the Clean Development Mechanism.14   
This timing of events will have important consequences in the awareness process that 
occurred in the companies. 
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 This created strong incentives for firms operating in industrialized countries to involve themselves into 
emission reduction in developing countries. 
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− Stage 1: Awareness/Risk 
 
Keeping this historical context in mind, we are now discussing similarities and differences 
in the strategies of DuPont for the CFC risk and Lafarge for CO2 risk. In both cases, the 
emissions concern the manufacturing operations of these companies. 
 
Awareness  
The quantification of the risks for both firms is easy. In the early eighties, DuPont had 
50% market share in CFC in the US and 25% worldwide with this business accounting for 2% 
of total sales .15 In 2008, cement accounted for 57% of Lafarge total sales, the cost increase in 
cement at a price for CO2 of 30€/t would induce an increase in cash cost of about 20€/t (based 
on an emission rate of .7 ton CO2 per ton of cement). This puts the cement industry as the 
most affected sector in terms of cost increase (the unit cost being around 45€/t), making the 
EU cement industry vulnerable to pollution heavens (relocation in countries that would not 
regulate their CO2 emissions).16 
 
Actions at the corporate level to mitigate regulation 
On both sides, awareness triggered some lobbying effort to delay regulation. DuPont 
launched a voluntary effort of industry through the Alliance for Responsible CFC as early as 
1980. DuPont also publicly questioned the scientific connection between CFC and the ozone 
hole, but founded public research to get further evidence. Lafarge had discouraged early 
attempts to introduce a carbon tax in France in the nineties and prompted industry efforts 
during the renegotiation phases of the successive EU-ETS to have cement classified as a 
“sensitive” sector to reduce the impact of a unilateral CO2 price in the EU on the 
competitiveness of the industry. 
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 For a detailed account of DuPont CFC strategy, see Smith (1998). The data mentioned in this paper in relation 
to CFC mostly comes from this article. 
16
 Competitiveness issues for the cement industry are discussed in particular in Hourcade et al. (2007). See 
Ponssard &Walker (2008) for a quantification of these issues. 
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Corporate commitments 
The risk for business also triggered positive actions. DuPont openly recognized that if a 
valid scientific connection was established between CFC and the ozone hole, it would 
immediately stop its CFC production. As a matter of fact, the scientific consensus was almost 
total prior the Montreal protocol. Consequently, in 1988, DuPont made public its decision to 
reduce its CFC production to zero by 1994.17 In 2000, the CEO of Lafarge made a public 
commitment to reduce the Lafarge emissions of CO2 by 20% over the period 1990 to 2010. 
Such statements seemed to have come as surprises for operational managers in both 
companies. According to internal sources, these managers did not consider that it would be 
feasible. 
 
No change in boundary systems but a slight adaptation of internal control systems 
At the operational level, both companies integrated CFC and CO2 risks respectively as 
being part of their business as usual. In DuPont, which is a ‘science’ company making its 
profit on technical innovations, the CFC risk induced R&D programs to elaborate substitutes 
to CFC, but the R&D budget remained in line with the average R&D spending in other areas. 
Lafarge operational commitment for CO2 was associated with its ongoing energy efficiency 
program which involved optimization of inputs (gas, coal, electricity, biomass,…), 
optimization of yields, as well as the incremental substitution of cementations materials (slag, 
flying ashes) for clinker, being the high energy intensive ingredient in cement. Thus, in both 
companies, no radical change was encouraged through specific new programs and/or design 
of specific incentives. The nature of these operations demonstrates that both companies’ 
boundary systems had not changed. 
 
Differentiated impacts on beliefs systems 
There are some interesting differences between the two companies in terms of beliefs 
systems. For DuPont, its CFC strategy has been progressively reintegrated into its larger 
corporate environmental targets. DuPont environmental commitments in 1989 involved 70% 
reductions in air toxics and 90% reductions in air carcinogens, 35% less in hazardous waste. 
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 DuPont had just developed a clean substitute for CFC at that time. This certainly helped to make that a 
decision that was considered as a complete reversal by other members of the Alliance for Responsible CFC. Still 
the commitment to eliminate CFC by 1994 remained ambitious due to the many applications and the sunk 
investments in these applications. 
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In 1994, DuPont further committed to a 40% reduction in GHG emissions (2000/1990).18 In 
contrast, Lafarge operations in CO2 were not connected to its long standing commitment on 
environmental issues (the license to operate for cement plants requires special attention to 
local stakeholders for quarries, logistics, emissions of gases and dust; this also concerns the 
other activities of Lafarge, thus its global involvement in environmental issues). Interestingly, 
Lafarge had its CO2 goal certified by WWF in 2000, but did not use this partnership to change 
its beliefs systems. CO2 remained a public relation issue at the corporate office to quantify the 
risk for the company and external lobbying efforts, and a reinforcement issue on energy 
efficiency programs for operations. 
 
− Stage 2: Vision/Opportunities 
 
So far, in our analysis, climate change issues have not substantially changed the vision of 
the firm. At this point in the analysis, we will look at a ’turnaround’, something that denotes 
that the ‘frame’ used to stimulate initiatives, evaluate decisions, promote managers, has 
changed. 
 
DuPont, as a result of CFC has a clear historical advantage in this matter. It provides an 
illustrative example of such a change. Unilever will provide another illustration. 
 
Changes in beliefs systems at DuPont 
In 1999, DuPont coined a new term to describe its vision, “sustainable growth”. This 
vision was associated with a major move of the company from fossil fuel technology to green 
technology. It acquired Pioneer in 1997, a major seed and biotechnology company and 
divested Conoco in 1998, a major oil company (acquired only a few years earlier). Its 
commitments were reformulated to highlight the change. The sustainability targets made in 
1999 for 2010 involved a large spectrum of new goals: (1) to be flat on energy (base 1990) in 
spite of growth, (2) to source 10% of its energy use from renewable energy, (3) to remain 
below 65% in terms of its total GHG emissions compared to 1990, (4) to generate 25% 
revenues from products based on non-renewable resources. As a result of these major 
                                                 
18
 By 2003, it had reduced its emissions by 72%. Then it reset its base line in 2004, see current target figure 2. 
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strategic choices, DuPont’s beliefs systems shifted from just thinking of CO2 as a liability/cost 
reduction issue to thinking about it as an opportunity issue as well. 
 
Changes in beliefs systems at Unilever 
As seen in figure 2, CO2 direct emissions from Unilever are relatively low. However, the 
indirect impacts of Unilever activities on climate change are very significant. We already 
mentioned the case of deforestation.19 Overall deforestation accounts for approximately 18 % 
of world total CO2 emissions. Indonesia alone holds the global record for GHG emissions 
from deforestation, putting this country in the third place behind the USA and China in terms 
of total GHG emissions from human activity. That is the reason why, being the world leader 
buyer of palm oil, Unilever has been targeted by Greenpeace as fueling climate change. 
Taking now other products of Unilever such as detergents and personal care products, the 
usages of these products are intensive in energy. As a matter of fact, while manufacturing 
activities in Unilever are not accountable for large CO2 emissions, suppliers and customers of 
Unilever products are. To respond to this challenge, Unilever introduced its new vision about 
climate change around 2006, following an earlier awareness/risk phase similar to the one 
described above. The reduction of CO2 emissions for Unilever is now part of its overall vision 
to minimize its environmental footprint (water, sustainable agriculture, energy, packaging…) 
all along the value added chain while delivering valuable consumer goods.  
 
Changes in boundary systems 
The reformulation of the CO2 issue as a whole value-chain issue can be illustrated through 
the launching of long term global programs. DuPont has engaged in the developing of the 
next generation of bio-fuels: Cellulosic ethanol, a joint venture with Danisco, and Biobutanol, 
under development with BP. DuPont also creates value-adding materials from renewable-
sourced feed-stocks and bio-based ingredients for various industrial applications. DuPont is 
expecting that 60% of its business will stem from the use of biotechnology to reduce fossil 
fuels in the next decades. Such expectations need to be evaluated in the context of changes in 
the whole value chain with their indirect consequences for agricultural sustainability. In 2004, 
Unilever became a founding member of the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO). In 
May 2008, following a public challenge from Greenpeace, Unilever formalized its 
                                                 
19
 On the link between Unilever and deforestation see the Greenpeace report (2008). 
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commitment to draw all its palm oil from certified sustainable sources by 2015. Through the 
RSPO, the company supports an initiative to put pressure on suppliers and users of palm oil to 
change their ways via certification bodies and NGOs. The future of this initiative remains 
uncertain, given the many usages of palm oil, often in small proportions to other ingredients, 
and by the many players at each level of the value added chain.20 In some other activities, the 
global strategy seems easier to implement, such as in tea, an activity in which Unilever is also 
a world leader (Poret, 2009). In 2007, Unilever announced its commitment to achieve in 2015 
a sourcing of all its tea sustainably from a Rainforest Alliance Certification. This certification 
involves measurements on ten sustainability indicators for producers: soil fertility, soil loss, 
nutrients, pest management, biodiversity, product value, energy, water, social capital and local 
economy. In all its divisions, Unilever managers implement a “Brand Imprint Tool” that 
prompts them to “think about where they source their ingredients and how they can get value 
from communicating this to consumers” (Paul Polman, Chief Executive Officer, Unilever 
website).  
 
Diagnostic and interactive systems are systematically changed  
To elect as part of a stage 2 strategy, we have to see how these visions have been 
integrated into firms’ management and management systems. The fact that the organizational 
chart and the control systems have changed are illustrative of such integration. For example, 
at DuPont, we now have a VP Chief Sustainability Officer, a Sustainable Growth Review for 
each business, a Corporate Environmental Plan, a more systematic link to compensation, 
decentralized competence centers for sustainable growth, local champions, awards… At 
Unilever, there are a Board-level Corporate Responsibility and Reputation Committee and a 
Corporate Responsibility, Issues, Sustainability and Partnerships (CRISP) leadership team, 
which review the BU strategic plans along the key performance indicators (KPIs) associated 
with the global sustainability targets. This illustrates the importance of both quantitative 
(KPIs) and subjective indicators (such as symbolic prizes associated to local champions and 
awards) in the incentive systems when conducting strategic renewal. 
 
                                                 
20
 On December 11, 2009 Unilever announced that it suspended its supplies from Sinar Mas, until it provides 
substantial, evidence that its operations did not involved deforestation in Indonesia. Greenpeace considered this 
as a consequence of its pressure on Unilever.  
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3.3 Putting the pieces together 
The next two figures (3&4) summarize our two-stage model and its application to the 
DuPont case.  
 
 STAGE 1 STAGE 2 
CO2 Strategic 
Approach Awareness/Risk Vision/Opportunities 
Beliefs Systems 
No change 
− Integration of the climate 
policy strategy in the firm’s 
vision 
Boundary Systems 
No change 
− Systematic review of 
portfolios’ activities 
including suppliers and 
clients’ relationships 
Diagnostic Systems 
− Measurement of CO2 
emissions at plant 
level 
− Incremental and local 
adaptation of energy 
efficiency programs 
− Compliance approach 
(regulation) 
− (Re)designing of the firm’s 
position in the value chain 
targets’ setting 
− Integration of environmental 
issues in strategic reviews 
− Joint design and cross-
functional implementation 
of diagnostic and interactive 
systems 
− Introduction of financial and 
symbolic motivations Interactive Systems 
− Focus at corporate 
level on risks 
associated with 
ongoing and future 
regulation 
 
Figure 3: the two stage model 
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 STAGE 1 
(1980-1999) 
STAGE 2 
(1999-2009) 
CO2 Strategic 
Approach Awareness/Risk Vision/Opportunities 
Beliefs Systems 
− As regards 
environmental issues, 
ongoing compliance 
beliefs systems are 
not affected  
− New vision: holistic 
approach to sustainability 
through voluntary actions 
including “footprint 
reduction goals” and for the 
first time “market-facing 
goals” 
Boundary Systems 
− No questioning of 
DuPont’s portfolio 
since CFC represents 
only 2% of total sales 
− Major move from fossil fuel 
technology to green 
technology 
− Partnerships along the value 
chain 
Diagnostic Systems 
− Measurement of 
CFCs emissions at 
plant level 
− R&D programs to 
generate substitutes 
− Change of organizational 
chart and control systems 
− Nomination of a VP Chief 
Sustainability Officer,  
− Implementation of a 
Sustainable Growth Review 
for each business 
− Cross-functional 
competence centers 
− Local champions and 
awards   
Interactive Systems 
− Launch of the 
Alliance for 
Responsible CFC to 
preempt regulation 
− Direct involvement in 
the elaboration of the 
Montreal protocol 
 
Figure 4 : application to DuPont 
 
Our analysis confirms the importance of transforming the four types of management 
systems in accordance with the CSR challenge. It also demonstrates that shifting from a stage 
one strategy based on risk and compliance to a stage two strategy whose goal is to generate 
new innovations and strategic opportunities requires: 1) a cross-functional approach, and 2) a 
coherent transformation of the four systems aligned with the new strategic targets. As 
claimed, it provides a more nuanced view than the broad picture described in section 2. As it 
will be seen shortly, it also provides a systematic framework to organize case studies.  
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4 The Porter hypothesis revisited: what have we learnt? 
In this section, we come back to the Porter hypothesis. Will an increased environmental 
pressure for the reduction of CO2 emissions generate more profitability? Our contribution will 
be discussed at two micro levels: the firm level and the sector level.21 We build on our 
exploratory research to formulate questions that look interesting to pursue. 
 
There are probably as many case studies in which firms benefit from more stringent 
environmental regulation and societal pressure as ones in which they experience an increase 
in costs and a reduction in profits. Our own case studies confirm these ambiguous results. But 
we can go one step further since we propose a systematic framework to organize these cases 
studies. It suggests that the beneficial case studies would be more likely to be in stage two and 
the detrimental ones in stage one. A systematic test of this proposition would bring light on 
the capacity of the corresponding firms to either take full benefit of the change or be sucked in 
a compliance/risk strategy. Our main contribution on this question concerns the hypothesis 
that, to be in stage two, a firm must design its management systems in order to be in an 
alignment of the middle managers with the vision of the firm formulated at the corporate 
level. Another contribution of our analysis concerns the dynamic nature of stage two. The 
strategic turnaround that we associate with such a repositioning implies that the potential 
benefit is risky and long termed. It certainly cannot be considered as a “free lunch” as 
suggested by a literal interpretation of the Porter hypothesis.   
 
A more general question may be stated at the sector level. For instance, are there structural 
factors that would imply that firms in the cement sector would be more likely to be in stage 
one while firms in the chemical or agro-food sectors would be in stage two? In other words, 
would Holcim and Cemex be positioned as Lafarge, while Bayer and Rhodia would be 
positioned as DuPont, and Danone and Nestlé as Unilever? It would indeed certainly be 
worthwhile to see if our model may be applied at the sector level: could steel, petroleum be 
considered as in stage one while chemicals, food, automobile… be considered as in stage 
two? Our research suggests some clues to investigate this point: whether the nature of the 
sector facilitates some diversification, whether it is concentrated on manufacturing or on the 
                                                 
21
 We leave aside the macro level. 
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design and/or the assembly of components, or the significance of R&D and the speed with 
which new products are introduced into the portfolio…  
 
Finally, and probably the most challenging issue, is to address the question concerning the 
possible identification of the key factors that would trigger the passage from stage one to 
stage two at the sector level. For instance, one may consider that a sustained high price for 
petroleum would accelerate the passage of chemicals from stage one to stage two, assuming 
that it is not already there. The identification of some firms already in stage two, in a sector to 
be globally considered in stage one, would also be a key factor. For instance, it may be that 
some firms in the construction sector are already in stage two: such as construction builders 
which may have more flexibility to adjust their strategies than the manufacturers of cement 
and steel. Our research does indeed emphasize the changes that occur along the whole value 
chain and the development of partnerships to take advantage of these changes.   
5 Implications for investors  
In this section, we develop some implications that may be drawn from our work for 
investors that are concerned with the possible impact of climate change on the value of their 
portfolios. 
 
It is interesting to note that the debate about CO2 among investors is also progressively 
shifting away from cost and risk toward the question on how to capitalize on financial 
opportunities. Investors increasingly believe that climate change will present many business 
opportunities in the near future (Deutsche Bank Advisors, 2008; Oddo Securities, 2008). 
According to a former leading consultancy, firms which will recognize the challenge of 
climate change early and elaborate on it to innovate will benefit from a competitive advantage 
and therefore prosper (Lehman Brothers, 2007). However, despite acknowledging the 
potential for strategic renewal regarding climate change, most investors keep assessing 
companies with an awareness/risk approach and not a vision/opportunities one. For instance, 
the assessment tool being used the most by investors to evaluate a firm’s CO2 emissions 
consists of calculating its carbon footprint, by estimating its number of Certified Emissions 
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Reduction (CER).22 The purpose of such calculation is to evaluate the financial gains/loss 
associated with the virtual valuation of these climate credits on the emission trading market 
(e.g. virtual valuation since investors do not directly benefit/pay for these CER). Although 
this assessment permits the identification of the firms which have mitigated their CO2 
emissions (i.e. stage 1), it does not enable the selection of the firms which have conducted 
strategic renewal according to climate change (i.e. stage 2). Yet, it is this second type of 
companies that investors should select for their portfolios to generate better financial 
performance in the long term. 
 
For investors to shift from a stage one to a stage two approach when evaluating 
companies’ CO2 strategic approaches requires building new assessment tools. Our two stage 
model is an attempt to fill this gap. Namely, it should provide some guiding principles to the 
question “which firms are in a position to materialize what gains?” It suggests analyzing 
differently a company in stage one from one in stage two. In line with recent approaches 
developed by brokers (Oddo Securities, 2008) and social rating agencies (Innovest, 2007) to 
assess firms based on their business opportunities regarding climate change, our analysis 
insists on the importance of studying the potential for strategic and organizational change 
generated by CO2 emissions at the sector and firm levels. Firstly, we suggest maintaining the 
so-called ‘best-in-class’ approach, which consists of selecting the best firms regarding CO2 
emissions in each sector. Two reasons motivate this choice: on the one hand, when building a 
portfolio, a firm must be assessed in comparison to its peers; on the other hand, it cannot be 
ignored that most of investors will not exclude sectors such as oil or building materials from 
their portfolios even if they are considered as a laggards in terms of CO2 strategies. Secondly, 
we suggest identifying different scenarios according to the stage of the sector regarding CO2 
strategies.  
 
These two different scenarios can be outlined according to the following approach:  
− Scenario 1 - the whole sector is at stage one: in a few sectors, all firms appear to be 
more or less at stage one regarding CO2 emissions, possibly in real estate, oil or 
building materials. In such cases, the traditional approach based on risk/awareness 
                                                 
22
 Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) are climate credits (or carbon credits) issued by the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) Executive Board for emission reductions achieved by CDM projects 
and verified by a Department of Energy under the rules of the Kyoto Protocol. 
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when assessing firms would be the rule. For instance, an investor could start by 
identifying the level of CO2 emissions associated with the firm’s operations and ask 
for actions that mitigate these emissions. It could proceed to identify the CO2 content 
associated with the products, anticipating that a carbon tax of this content will affect 
the market value of these products. 
 
− Scenario 2 - at least one firm in the sector is at stage two: this means that climate 
change has generated business opportunities for the sector, possibly in chemicals, 
water or food products sectors. When faced with this situation, an investor must favor 
the most promising firms regarding CO2 strategies. These firms can be identified using 
the different characteristics developed in the second stage of our model, such as the 
reformulation of the firm’s vision, corporate culture, the integration of dedicated 
diagnostic, interactive systems in the general planning and control systems of the firm.    
 
A more challenging grid would ask why and when a firm would move from stage one to 
stage two. Our analysis suggests that the key factors to consider would be the following ones: 
 
− The ‘new vision’ that incorporates climate change as a major ingredient of the 
company culture should be based upon in depth internal studies identifying the risks 
for the company and its capacity to successfully address these risks in a stage one 
strategy. 
 
− The involvement of the CEO in the formulation and the communication of the new 
vision is a key factor, which is usual in organization theory. To discern such an 
involvement from green washing, it seems important to link the CEO vision to the 
formulation of explicit new CSR targets.   
 
− The quantification of these new targets should be integrated in the management 
control systems; note that it is possible to evaluate from outside if this is the case 
through an analysis of the KPIs introduced at the business unit levels, along with 
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changes in the compensation package, as well as in changes in the general strategic 
review process.  
 
− The identification of a stage two strategy remains the change in the carbon intensity of 
the portfolio of activities of the firm, as well as their positioning into the whole value 
chain; the capacity of the firm to articulate its current strategy in this respect provides 
a direct indication that its vision has changed its boundary systems and is delivering 
results. 
 
− An interesting factor for assessing the change from stage one to stage two may be that 
the firm now engages into positive partnerships and interactions with NGOs and 
scientists to formulate and implement its strategy.  
 
This move from stage one to stage two is easier to identify in the second scenario (i.e. at 
least one firm in the sector is at stage two) than in the first scenario (i.e. all firms are at stage 
one). Indeed, in the second scenario, other firms can be assessed in comparison to the sector 
leader. In case of the first scenario, the reasons which explain why no firm has been in stage 
two must be searched: Do the technical problems that prevent from innovations require major 
breakthroughs? Are clients reluctant to change? Have the leaders an interest in the status quo? 
Are the competitive forces not so important? And so forth. Once the reasons identified, 
investors may choose 1) to keep using a stage one approach when selecting the firms in the 
sector; 2) to encourage the leaders of the sector to shift from stage one to stage two; 3) to 
favor firms at stage two belonging to other sectors but which can be good substitutes (for 
example, investing in firms belonging to the oil services sector instead of the more classical 
integrated oil & gas sector). While our research has identified the existence of different stages 
to position a sector, further research is clearly needed to explain what prevents some sectors 
from shifting from stage one to stage two. 
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6 Conclusion 
The objective of this paper was to revisit the Porter hypothesis from a managerial 
perspective. We have proposed a framework to position a climate change strategy of a firm 
consisting of a simple two stage model: awareness/risk, in which compliance and incremental 
improvements are the rule, and vision/opportunity, which may induce a more global re-
assessment of the portfolio of the firm including its relationship with suppliers and clients. 
Our construction is based upon three case studies: DuPont (chemicals), Lafarge (building 
materials) and Unilever (consumer goods).  
 
The results have been used to revisit the possible relationship between an increase in 
environmental constraints and the profitability of the firm, contingently at the stage the firm is 
considered to be in. Moreover, a number of key factors that may trigger the shift from stage 
one to stage two have been identified: integration of the climate change policy into the beliefs 
systems of the firm, involvement of the CEO in the formulation of the environmental targets 
for the whole company, integration of these targets into the planning and control systems. 
 
Our work suffers from a number of limitations: our empirical base should clearly be 
extended. This may lead to a refinement of the model. At some point, this should generate a 
number of hypotheses that would be amenable to systematic testing. On the more practical 
side, the implications we have developed for investors should be made more operational. In 
spite of its limitations, firms and investors may also be interested in using our model to 
position their own strategy. The clear architecture of the model would facilitate this 
positioning and, hopefully, provide a useful starting block for further analysis. 
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